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ABSTRACT: Something about being poor makes people fat.  Though there are many 
possible explanations for the income-body weight gradient, we investigate a promising but 
little-studied hypothesis: that economic insecurity acts as an independent cause of weight 
gain.  We use data on working age men from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY79) to identify the effect of various measures of economic insecurity on 
weight gain.  We find in particular that over the 12-year period between 1988 and 2000, a 
one point (0.01) increase in the probability of becoming unemployed causes weight gain 
over this period to increase by about one pound, and each realized drop in annual income 
results in an increase of about 5.5 pounds.  The mechanism also appears to work in reverse, 
with  health insurance and government “social safety net” payments  leading to smaller 
weight gains. 
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Worries go down better with soup than without. 
          --Jewish proverb 
Everyone knows why people gain weight:  They eat too much.  Or exercise 
too little.  Or lack self-control.  Or live in a world of abundant, low-cost calories.  
Or maybe it just runs in the family.   
That body weight is a function of a multitude of economic decisions—that is, 
decisions involving market transactions either directly (e.g., via the purchase of 
food, or labor-saving devices, or athletic club memberships) or indirectly (e.g., via 
the allocation of scarce leisure time to physical exertion)—is beyond dispute.  But 
as an economic decision problem, weight gain is intriguing because economic 
explanations must compete with (or be reconciled with) explicitly non-economic 
explanations from other fields, from psychology and sociology to nutrition science 
and even molecular genetics. In this article we focus on a particular purported 
cause of weight gain—economic insecurity—which is both related to popular 
theories from psychology and consistent with theory and evidence from behavioral 
biology.   
Economic insecurity—defined, roughly speaking, as the risk of catastrophic 
income loss faced by an individual or household—has not received much attention 
as an independent cause of obesity from economists or advocates of public health.
3  
But  viewed from the perspective of behavioral biology, the motivation for a 
relationship between insecurity and body fat is obvious: the reason humans and 
other animals evolved the ability to store body fat was presumably because it was 
necessary to survive periodic food shortages.  The evidence for this is surprisingly 
strong.  It has been demonstrated again and again, for instance, that animals in 
natural environments face very real periodic starvation risk, and that such risk is a 
strong predictor of fattening behavior (e.g., Ekman and Lilliendahl 1993, Shively 
and Wallace 2001).  It therefore seems reasonable to ask whether weight gain in 
humans  might  be—at least in part—the manifestation of an optimal fattening 
response to economic insecurity.
4  In the p ages that follow, we briefly review 
                                                            
3 A notable exception is to be found in a case study (Dietz 1995) of a young girl whose 
mother reported a monthly cycle of feast and famine (evidently induced by the manner in 
which food stamps and other social services payments were dispersed).  The author 
conjectured that the girl’s obesity might be a biologically induced response to periodic food 
shortage.  The dramatic relationship between food stamp distribution dates and dietary 
intake has since been confirmed empirically (Wilde and Ranney 2000, Wilde and Andrews 
2000).   
4 It is important to note that in humans, the mechanisms by which economic security might 
generate weight gains are likely to be deeply rooted in psychological and neuroendocrine 
systems (see Smith 2006 for a review).  One implication of this fact is that indicators of 
economic insecurity in modern human populations need not be associated with any 
appreciable real (or even perceived) risk of death by starvation in order to affect behavior 
and energy metabolism.  The potential for such an “evolutionary mismatch” generated by  
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previous studies of obesity,  report the results of  new empirical tests of our 
“economic insecurity” hypothesis, and discuss some implications for consumer 
welfare and public policy.   
Background and Theory 
Cross-sectional studies of the demography of body weight in the developed 
world have repeatedly shown that obesity and overweight status disproportionately 
affect  the  poor  (e.g.,  Chang and Lauderdale 2005).  There are a number of 
plausible explanations for this, with causation  potentially  running in either 
direction: Higher body weights may lead to lower wages, either directly (via 
effects on physical mobility) or indirectly (via employment discrimination; see, 
e.g., Cawley 2004).  Weight and income may be negatively correlated due to 
unobserved personal characteristics such as self-discipline or impulsivity (Cutler et 
al. 2003).  And there might be pure income effects on economic decisions about 
health,
5 physical activity, and food consumption.
6   
But this coincidence of poverty with obesity is intriguing, in part, because—
the aforementioned explanations notwithstanding—economic theory would seem 
to predict just the opposite.  One thing about weight loss that everyone seems to 
agree on is that eating well and being physically active take time: it takes much 
less time to eat calorie-intensive fast food, for instance, than it does to consume 
freshly prepared meals, and it takes less time to travel by car than on foot.  And if 
“being thin” is a time-intensive good, then we should expect those with the highest 
opportunity cost of time—i.e., those with high wages—to choose less of it.  
Moreover, this “time cost” theory of obesity has been borne out empirically, as a 
number of studies by economists have provided indirect evidence that the time cost 
of weight gain has driven the increase in obesity observed in recent decades:  
Cutler  et al. (2003), for instance, emphasize the role of food processing 
technologies in reducing the time cost of food preparation; Lakdawalla and 
Philipson (2002) argue that Americans have gained weight in part because the 
workplace has become more sedentary (i.e., whereas much of the populace was 
effectively paid to exercise on the job a generation ago, today most jobs involve 
                                                                                                                                                   
rapid technological change is emphasized by Smith (2004), Dasgupta and Maskin (2005), 
and Smith and Tasnádi (2007).   
5 A number of authors report a strong positive relationship between income and various 
measures of health (see, e.g., Marmot  et al. 1991, Case  et al. 2002, Deaton 2002).  
Sapolsky (2005) argues that physiologic responses to economic distress could plausibly 
generate many of the observed income-related health disparities.   
6 Reed et al. (2005), for instance, find positive income elasticities across a number of food 
purchase categories.  Drewnowski (2004) argues that low-income households choose foods 
of low nutritional value in part because such foods are the most cost-effective source of 
calories.    
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nothing more strenuous than sitting at a desk); and Chou et al. (2004) point to the 
increasing prevalence of fast food restaurants as a key determinant of the observed 
trend.   
Two Income Effects 
It is possible, of course, that the opportunity cost of time does cause body 
weight to rise with income, while another income-related phenomenon works in 
the opposite direction.  This brings us to the  distinction between income and 
income security.  As noted above, the primary biological function of body fat is its 
role as a form of precautionary savings.  This would seem to suggest that in an 
optimal fattening framework, body fat should increase with both the  level of 
currently available resources and with the variability of expected future resources.  
Consider the following two-period, two-state model:  Suppose that a consumer 
lives for two periods, receives either high (w ( ) or low (w ) ) income in each period, 
and chooses first-period consumption ( 1 c ) and body fat ( 1 f ) such that the sum of 
expected lifetime utilities is maximized.  The consumer’s first-period decision can 
be stated as: 





cEuwf u d ++ %   (1) 
subject to 
111 cfw +£ 
where  1 w  is the realized income level in period 1,  2 w %  is a random variable 
representing income in period 2, and  ( ) 0,1 d ˛  is the factor by which metabolic 
energy depreciates when stored as body fat.  If we assume further that the 
probability  t p  of receiving the low-income payoff  w )  in period  t  is fixed but 
unknown, then the realized value of  1 w  will have two distinct effects: it determines 
i) the size of the period 1 income constraint, and ii) it influences the consumer’s 
subjective beliefs about the probability of receiving the low-income payoff in 
period 2.  Moreover, if  ( ) u ￿  is increasing, continuously differentiable, and strictly 
concave, it is easy to show that these two “income effects” on body fat ( 1 f ) work 
in opposite directions.  Consider, for instance, the special case in which the 
probability of receiving  w )  is either  secure p  or  insecure p  ( secureinsecure pp < ).  Then 
the first-order conditions for (1) become: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1211211 |1| cPwwwwfPwwwwf uuu dddd ==++-=+ ¢¢¢ )))(   (2) 
and 
  111 cfw +=  (3) 
where 
  ( ) ( ) 2121 || PwwwwPwwww ==<== )())   (4)  
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by Bayes’s Rule.



















,  (4) implies that  the unambiguously 
positive effect of current income ( 1 w ) on body fat (1 f ) is offset by an 
unambiguously negative “income security” effect.
8   
In other words, low income today will make the consumer thinner (because 
less money is available for precautionary fattening) but it also makes him fatter 
(because it gives him reason to believe that low income is more likely tomorrow).  
At this level of abstraction, we cannot draw a priori conclusions about the relative 
magnitudes of these two effects with confidence, but the theory tells us that they 
will depend on the distribution of income payoffs and the degree of concavity in 
the utility function.   
A Rational Psychology of Weight Gain 
In addition to offering a fresh explanation for the negative association 
between income and body weight, we believe that a putative causal relationship 
between economic insecurity and body weight is worthy of further study for two 
reasons.  First of all, as noted above, it has the appeal of a normative theory when 
viewed from the perspective of behavioral biology, and the rich literature in the 
realm of animal fattening overlaps with parallel studies of human obesity in 
                                                            
7 In particular, for arbitrary prior beliefs  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1insecure1secure 1 p PP pppp == =-= , 
( ) 0,1 p ˛ ,  ( )
( ) ( )( )



































)) .  Expression (4) follows directly.   















 implied by the first-order conditions are: 
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)))( .  Both 
are positive by concavity of  ( ) u ￿ .  The latter expression is, of course, not precisely the 
“time cost” effect discussed in the literature; this would be more akin to examining the 
effects of the changes in the parameter  d  (which can be interpreted as the “price” of body 





 is ambiguous, with an 
unambiguously positive substitution effect and an offsetting (unambiguously negative) 
income effect.  Assuming the substitution effect dominates, the time-cost prediction that 
body fat will increase when the “price” of being thin rises (i.e., the value of  d  rises) is 
borne out.    
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intriguing ways.
9  And while caution should always be exercised when applying a 
naturalistic model to human behavior, it is widely accepted that modern obesity is 
somehow related to the fact that much of human evolutionary history has been 
characterized by caloric scarcity. 
But perhaps more importantly, our hypothesis about the relationship between 
economic stressors and weight gain is consistent with what is known about the 
psychology of exercise and diet.  Nutritionists, for instance, often refer to “stress-
induced eating” and “comfort foods” when exploring the personal reasons for 
excessive body weight (Greeno and Wing 1994, Dallman et al. 2003).  And certain 
types of depression—notably seasonal disorders triggered by annual fluctuations in 
the length of the day—are associated with weight gain, in ways that mimic the 
behavior of animals faced with imminent starvation (Madden et al. 1996).   
There is also the  ubiquitous  “self-control problem” suffered by just about 
anyone who has attempted to lose weight.  The relationship between self-control 
and economic uncertainty (or “default risk”) is direct.  Self-control is typically 
modeled in economics as a time inconsistency problem, in which the decision-
maker applies a declining rate of discount to future outcomes (e.g., Laibson 1997), 
and as a result perpetually makes choices that seem (in retrospect) to be regrettable 
and contrary to his long term well-being.  This, of course, is exactly how one might 
describe the behavior of an individual who receives an uninterrupted stream of 
income over time (e.g., a series of w (  outcomes in a multi-period extension of the 
model developed above) that he believes to be at risk:  he would experience 
perpetual regret at his over-reaction to perceived risk, and as he updates his beliefs 
about the likelihood of default (e.g., a w )  outcome), this “excessive discounting” 
problem would diminish.
10,11  Translated into the terminology of diet: we should 
expect people to overeat when faced with economic insecurity.  Moreover, this 
view of the psychology of self-control would suggest that one side-effect of 
mechanisms that “cushion the blow” of catastrophic income loss (by providing, for 
example, event-contingent payments) should have a corresponding negative effect 
                                                            
9 To note but one area in which this is true, nearly every gene and molecular signal known 
to govern energy homeostasis and metabolism in mice has been shown to have a 
homologous counterpart in humans (Barsh et al. 2000). 
10 See Sozou (1998) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) for alternative formulations.   
11 A natural corollary to this observation is that if the risk is real, apparent time 
inconsistencies need not be indicative of a self-control  problem.  A surprisingly high 
proportion of U.S. households do appear to suffer more from risk than from lack of self-
control: some 11.2% report being “food insecure,” defined as being (at least) occasionally 
worried about having enough money to buy food (Nord et al. 2004).  A number of authors 
have reported positive associations between food insecurity and overweight status in 
women (Olson 1999, Townsend et al. 2001, Basiotis and Lino 2002, Gibson 2003, Wilde 
and Peterman 2006).    
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on body weight.
12  In a sense, then, the empirical results we report below constitute 
a test of an endogenous theory of self-control.   
An important clarification is in order at the outset.  Our aim is to measure the 
extent to which economic insecurity causes weight gain.  While our estimation 
strategy will control for the problems of reverse causation, unobservable personal 
characteristics, and income effects discussed above, our analysis will not (due to 
limitations in the data we employ) allow us to distinguish between intermediate 
mechanisms via which weight gain might occur.  It might be, for instance, that the 
economically insecure react to economic stressors (or lack thereof) by altering 
either the quantity or the quality of their diet.  Or it might be that economic 
insecurity makes people  depressed and therefore inactive, as if “economic 
insecurity” and “physical activity” were economic substitutes.  Or it might be that 
the psychology of economic insecurity simply induces a lower metabolic rate in 
those who experience it.  Distinguishing between these alternatives is a question 
we leave for future research.   
Empirical Approach 
Our analysis employs individual-level data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79).  The NLSY79 is a longitudinal survey 
that follows individuals born in the same cohort (born 1957-1964) over a number 
of years.  The longitudinal nature of this  survey allows us to  examine the 
relationship between changes in body weight over a 12-year period (ending in 
2000) and one’s personal experience with economic insecurity.  We expect that the 
primary determinants  of weight change over this period will include both  the 
respondent’s current (year 2000) circumstance (marital status, income, education, 
etc.) and his subjective beliefs about the probability of catastrophic income loss.  
Thus the inclusion of historical information in our suite of explanatory variables is 
motivated not by an explicitly dynamic theory of weight gain,
13 but rather by a 
                                                            
12 The negative effect of contingent payments on body weight is implied by our model 
because 
( ) ( )

















13 A dynamic specification might be called for, for instance, if many months or years were 
required to adjust one’s weight to a new optimal level, or if the long-term health impacts of 
weight gain were an important determinant of body weight.  Since we focus instead on the 
effects of prospective (and potentially imminent) income loss, dynamic effects—if 
empirically important—could affect the error structure in Equation  (5).  We believe it 
unlikely that dynamic effects are important, however, because the barriers to rapid weight 
gain/loss appear to be more psychological than physiological (in other words, there is no 
physical reason the human central nervous system couldn’t accommodate rapid changes in 
weight), and because the long-term health effects of excessive body weight are unlikely to 
have been important in the pre-industrial world in which humans evolved.    
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desire to capture variation in perceived financial or economic insecurity.  Our 
specifications are thus of the form 
  2000,1988,2000, ijijijijjij WWXS abghs =++++  (5) 
where  tij W  is individual i ’s weight in year t,  2000,ij X  is a vector of individual i ’s 
personal characteristics in the year 2000, and  ij S  is a proxy for individual  i ’s 
subjective beliefs about his personal economic security.   j h  represents a regional 
fixed effect, and  ij s  is a disturbance term.  Robust standard errors are adjusted for 
an arbitrary within-state correlation pattern because many of the instruments are 
measured at the state level.
14   
Our primary concern with this specification is the potential for bias induced 
by the related problems of reverse causation and unobserved personal 
characteristics (that could be correlated with weight gain).  We would like to use 
an individual’s employment history, for instance, as a proxy for his beliefs about 
the probability of unexpected job loss.  But if heavier people are more likely to 
become unemployed (independent of their beliefs about risk), then estimation of 
(5) by ordinary least squares (OLS) will generate upward-biased estimates of g .  
This problem is partly (but not completely) ameliorated by the fact that we 
include weight in 1988 as a control variable.  This is equivalent to controlling 
directly for unobservable permanent and pre-1988 personal characteristics 
(including genetic background, childhood experience, and early employment and 
educational history) that might affect weight.  But in considering the effect on 
body weight of life events that occurred after 1988, we still must take care to 
measure only those events that  are  arguably exogenous.  In considering an 
individual report of job loss, for example, the loss may be due to (i) unobserved 
personal characteristics (e.g., personality traits—like discipline—associated with 
both poor performance on the job and weight), or (ii) because of employment 
discrimination on the part of the employer (e.g., because the individual has 
recently gained weight), or (iii) because of a downturn  in  the local economy.  
Because we are interested in whether (and to what extent) events like job loss 
cause weight gain, we would like to exclude events of the first two types from our 
analysis.   
For this reason, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy, 
in which our proxy for economic insecurity (and other variables of interest that are 
influenced by individual choices, like smoking and household income) is first 
regressed on observed personal characteristics and exogenous state- or MSA-level 
instruments.  In the second stage, weight gain is regressed on a vector of personal 
characteristics and the predicted values of our proxy for economic insecurity from 
                                                            
14 In practice, this was implemented using Stata’s cluster command, with clustering by 
state.  
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the first stage.  This is, of course, the statistical equivalent of establishing exclusion 
rules in medical research.   
To ensure that our instruments will not be correlated with unobserved 
personal characteristics, we use primarily state-level variables for this purpose, and 
whenever possible we have chosen policy variables set by state legislatures.  Our 
instruments are as follows:  To identify the causal effect of income and wages on 
weight gain, we use state median household income from the US Census and the 
legal minimum wage in the state, respectively, as instruments.
15  To identify the 
effect of unemployment experience between 1988 and 2000, we use the series of 
annual BLS unemployment rates in the geographic areas where the individual 
resided.  These are either the unemployment rate in the metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) or the unemployment rate associated with the rural parts of the state, 
depending on where the individual lived in each year.  For payments from 
government social services programs, we use the state maximum monthly welfare 
benefit for an eligible family of three, and for health insurance we use a vector of 
indicators of state-level regulations of the individual and small-group markets for 
health insurance that have been shown to influence health insurance prices.
16  To 
identify a causal effect of smoking, we follow the approach of Gruber and Frakes 
(2006) and use state cigarette taxes.
17  For various measures of fluctuations in 
annual household income, we construct state-level averages and median values 
directly from the NLSY79 data (pooling both men and women).
18   
With all of these state-level policy variables, the implicit identifying 
assumption is that while the state policy may affect the individual attribute of 
interest (income, transfer payments, insurance status, smoking, etc.), the state 
                                                            
15 Note that the effect of minimum wages on income may be ambiguous.  Minimum wages 
may increase incomes for minimum wage workers but may also increase unemployment.  
Either way, to the degree that the  minimum wage can predict income without being 
correlated with an individual’s weight, it is a valid instrument. 
16 See Congdon, William, Kowalski and Showalter (2005) for evidence on the connection 
between state regulations and health insurance prices. 
17 Using cigarette prices instead of taxes, following Chou et al. (2004), produces similar 
results. 
18 Instruments for income volatility based on data averages may not fully solve the 
identification problem.  For example, suppose that “laziness” is an omitted characteristic 
that is correlated with both the likelihood that an individual experiences an income drop 
and with weight gain.  If the state average for income drops is high because many people in 
that state are lazy, this approach will not resolve the identification problem.  If the average 
is more reflective of overall state economic conditions, then this instrument is more likely 
to be valid.  We therefore encourage more caution in interpreting these results than with the 
results for health insurance, for example, where the state policy is more clearly exogenous.  
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policy variable has no independent effect on weight after controlling for these 
individual characteristics.  Furthermore, individuals’ weights in a state are assumed 
not to affect the state policies.  All of these i nstruments appear to be highly 
correlated with the endogenous variables of interest, with F-statistics of the joint 
significance of the instruments in the first stage ranging from about 9 to 20.  
Because many of our equations are overidentified (for example, there are four 
health insurance state policies that instrument for health insurance status), we use a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in the IV analyses.
19 
Data 
We focus on the years 1988-2000, when all participants are older than 23 and had 
mostly completed their formal education.  The longitudinal nature of the survey 
allows for long-range measures of individual economic variables (like 
unemployment in the past, as well as employment status at the time the survey was 
administered), and it allows for an examination of individual weight changes rather 
than simply differences in weight levels across individuals.  The NLSY79 survey 
also includes data on other behaviors like smoking.   
We exclude women from our analysis for three reasons.  First, labor supply 
decisions for men are  more uniform than those of women, particularly as our 
sample is ages 23-42, prime childbearing years.  Second, body weight in women 
may be partly related to fertility decisions, and these decisions are also likely to be 
related to economic variables.  Third,  the economic security of  women in the 
NLSY79  cohort is more dependent on spousal income than it is for men, and 
spouse-level indicators of economic insecurity are not reported as comprehensively 
in NLSY79 as the individual-level indicators we utilize.
20   
The analysis also uses a number of other state-level variables.  These data 
include unemployment rates, median income, maximum welfare benefits for a 
family of three, and state health insurance regulations.  Sources for each of these 
variables are listed in the Data Appendix. 
Our data include three different measures of income security.  The first is the 
individual’s Bayesian posterior probability of unemployment.  This probability 
was calculated from weekly data on employment status available in NLSY79,  
based on a five-year (1996-2000) career horizon with prior distributions generated 
                                                            
19 See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) for a discussion of this estimator. 
20 Though we do not report them here, we did replicate the results presented in Tables 2 
through 4 below for females in the NLSY79 cohort.  In general, the results for women are 
broadly similar to what we find for men, though—as might be expected, given the concerns 
discussed above—the magnitudes of most insecurity-related coefficients are smaller, and 
standard errors larger.    
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from the full sample of NLSY79 men (see Data Appendix for details).
21    We 
hypothesize that individuals who face higher probabilities of future unemployment 
(as measured by their past experience) will gain more weight. 
The second set of measures for insecurity proxy for the rate of change and 
volatility implicit in the individual’s history of reported annual income.  These 
measures are the slope and  2 R
 from linear regressions of family income on a time 
trend, with a separate regression for each individual.  The slope coefficient of the 
regression (or “Rate of Change”) gives the individual’s typical annual increase in 
income from 1988 to 2000.  This annual increase may measure anticipated and 
predictable changes in income.  The  2 R  (or “Goodness of Fit”) is a measure of 
deviations from a linear trend, and therefore how much uncertainty an individual 
has faced.  Individuals with low  2 R  will have experienced an income stream that 
is either highly volatile or highly non-linear, and thus would be likely to consider 
current (year 2000) and future income to be more at-risk.  Note that this measure is 
likely to be affected not only by an individual’s employment history, but also by 
any changes in hours or wages, and changes in other components of household 
income, such as spousal employment. 
Unexpected positive shocks to income might affect weight differently than 
negative shocks.  The third measure of insecurity therefore measures the number of 
drops in real annual household income that an individual experienced from 1988 to 
2000.  Again, individuals with more drops in household income, for whatever 
reason, are likely to have higher perceived levels of economic insecurity and thus 
we expect them to experience higher weight gains. 
We also have three measures of “safety nets” that could serve the purpose of 
providing a source of income during periods of catastrophic income loss.  The first 
is inheritance payments due to the death of a friend or family member in 2000.  
This measure is arguably exogenous, because a friend or relative’s death is 
arguably an exogenous event.  We also examine health insurance status as another 
indicator of greater economic security, with state regulations that affect health 
insurance prices as the identifying instruments.  Finally, we examine the effect of 
total government transfer payments, which may act as a social safety net that 
mitigates economic insecurity.  These transfer payment include TANF payments, 
food stamps, social security insurance, unemployment insurance, and other public 
assistance payments.  As noted above, the identifying instrument for this variable 
is the state legislated maximum benefits for a family of three.   
The means and standard deviations of all variables are reported in Tables 1a 
and 1b.  On average, men in our sample weighed 177 pounds in 1988, and 198 
pounds in 2000  (for an average 12-year gain of 21 pounds).  Table 1a indicates 
that on the day the survey was administered in 2000, 2.6% of men in the sample 
                                                            
21 The posteriors are based on a five year horizon because the median tenure with a given 
employer is about four years for the NLSY sample.  (Mean tenure is about six years.)  A 
five year window is therefore limited to a period over which the “hazard rate” associated 
with employment status can be presumed to remain relatively constant.    
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were unemployed, and 11.8% were unemployed at some point during the year.  
The  average (posterior) probability of unemployment  in 2000 was  2.6%.  
Individuals in the sample experienced on average 2.1 drops in reported real annual 
income  between 1988 and 2000, and the average  2 R  from  individual-specific 
regressions of income on time was about 0.6.  On average, individuals received 
about $2,200 in inheritance payments (non-recipients coded as zero).  84% of 
individuals in our sample were covered by health insurance at the time of the 2000 
survey.  Unconditional average (non-recipients coded as zero) transfer payments 
(including AFDC payments, food stamps, social security insurance, and other 
public assistance payments)  received  in 2000  was $195.73.    Means  of other 
variables included in the regressions  (age, family income, height, race, marital 
status, education, etc.) are presented in Table 1a.   
Results 
Income and Wages 
Before examining the effects of insecurity on weight gain, we first examine 
the correlation between income and weight gain in our sample.  The results 
presented in  Table 2 show the effect of income, wage rate, and current 
unemployment on weight gain.  In this table and succeeding tables, we present a 
column of OLS results followed by the IV estimates.  In general, we have found 
that our state- or MSA-level instruments are highly significant and have the 
expected signs in the first stage regressions, with exceptions noted below.  For 
brevity, we have not presented first-stage results, but they are available from the 
authors on request. 
These regressions all include weight in 1988 as a control variable.  In most 
specifications, the coefficient on weight in 1988 cannot be statistically 
distinguished from 1.  As a result, the coefficients on the other variables of interest 
can be interpreted as indicating the effect of the variable on the weight gain over 
the 1988 to 2000 period.
22   
The OLS results in column 1 show that the estimated effect of income on 
weight change is negative (though not statistically significant), but in the IV 
specification it is positive, suggesting that (to the extent that there is a causal effect 
of income on weight) being poor makes people thinner, not fatter.
23  We then ask 
                                                            
22 Because many surveys do not include data on long-term changes in body weight, we 
replicated all specifications with 1988 weight omitted.  The estimated coefficients in these 
regressions (which we do not report) are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 through 
4 below, but the standard errors are much larger.   
23 We also tested for a nonlinear effect of income on body weight by expanding this 
specification to include the square of annual income, and found this second-order effect to 
be negative but not statistically significant.  Moreover, the magnitude of the nonlinear  
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(in columns 3-6) whether this positive income effect is driven by variation in the 
opportunity cost of time, and find strong evidence that it is.  In columns 3 and 4, 
we include hourly wage as an endogenous regressor, and find that  (in the IV 
specification of column 4), a $1 increase in hourly wage results in an additional 
0.34 pounds in body weight gained over this period.  
Hourly wages used in columns 3-4 are derived from annual wage income and 
annual hours worked, and are therefore not available for those who have been 
unemployed all year.  These estimates therefore exclude  such individuals.  
Estimates of the effects of current unemployment are presented in columns 5 and 
6.
24  We distinguish between unemployment “anytime this year” and 
unemployment “on the day of the survey” because we expect to observe a strong 
distinction in the effects of these two variables on body weight: while the latter is 
indicative of an individual with an opportunity cost of time of approximately zero 
(which should dramatically affect decisions about diet and exercise), the former 
indicates an individual who may not currently be unemployed, but faces a high risk 
of becoming unemployed.  Although we instrument for unemployment “anytime 
this year” in the IV specifications, we treat  “unemployed  at time of survey” 
responses as exogenous, as the particular day on which a person was interviewed 
should not be related to unobserved personal characteristics.  Again, the time cost 
prediction is borne out: though estimated imprecisely  ( ) 0.31 p = , being currently 
unemployed at the time of the survey in 2000 is associated with a  7-pound 
decrease in weight gained.
25  But the strong positive (17-pound) effect of “anytime 
in 2000” unemployment status is suggestive of another effect of unemployment: 
the risk of becoming unemployed appears to cause an increase in weight gained.  
We now turn our attention to this “economic insecurity” aspect of unemployment.   
Economic Insecurity 
Table 3  shows the effect of  the  three different measures of economic 
insecurity on weight gains between 1988 and 2000.  The first two columns control 
for economic insecurity by including the Bayesian probability of unemployment, 
                                                                                                                                                   
effect was exceedingly small, such that the marginal effect of income on weight gain 
remains positive  until annual income exceeds $600,000 (which is nearly double the 
maximum income reported in our sample).  These results are not reported in Table 2, but 
are available from the authors upon request.   
24 Including measures of unemployment, wages, and income  together creates problems 
with collinearity because wages are a derived measure in these data.  For this reason, we 
control for annual income (but not wage) in these and all subsequent specifications.  This 
also allows us to also include all of the unemployed in the analysis.   
25 This is consistent with reports by Ruhm (2000, 2005) that periods of low employment in 
the U.S. have historically been associated with decreases in body weight.    
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derived from the individual’s past unemployment experience.  The IV r esults 
presented in Column 2 indicate that a 1% increase in the probability of becoming 
unemployed causes an increase in body weight of just over one pound.
26  We use 
the Bayesian posterior in order to capture the individual’s anticipated future risk of 
unemployment that drives their weight gain.  However, in unreported 
specifications, we also find that using the number of weeks unemployed over the 
past five years yields similar results.  Using longer windows of time attenuates the 
results, as might be expected if unemployment experience in the distant past are 
less predictive of future spells of unemployment.   
The next two columns use measures of the rate of change and “noise” implicit 
in  the individual’s history of reported annual income.  Note that in the IV 
specification reported in Column 4, an increase in “goodness of fit” (equivalent to 
2 R  in least-squares regression analysis) by 0.1 units corresponds to a decrease in 
body weight of 2.9 pounds.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals 
with more volatile streams of income anticipate future income insecurity, and 
respond by gaining weight. 
The final two columns use an alternative (and much simpler) measure of the 
insecurity associated with this same annual income stream: the number of drops in 
reported annual income from one survey to the next.  Again, economic insecurity 
seems to generate weight gain: in the IV estimates, for each additional year in 
which real income drops, the typical individual in our sample gains 5.5 pounds.   
Perhaps it is also worth noting that coefficients on other variables in Table 3 
are consistent with the economic insecurity hypothesis.  Being black or Hispanic is 
associated with (statistically significant) weight gains; and  smoking appears to 
induce weight loss.  The consistent and strong results on race and ethnicity are 
interesting because they admit a number of possible alternative explanations: i t 
could be that blacks and Hispanics are subject to employment discrimination (and 
hence are faced, on average, with higher levels of economic insecurity than white 
non-Hispanic men); it could be that genetic differences between racial and ethnic 
groups generate differences in weight gain; or there could be other unobserved 
traits or characteristics (e.g.,  culturally derived differences in  dietary quality) 
associated with these groups that are also associated with weight gain.  The 
negative effect of smoking on weight gain is interesting because it has been noted 
that the nicotine in cigarettes appears to target the same systems in the human brain 
that are stimulated by indicators of economic security, and that smoking might be 
properly thought of as a “self-medicating” response to economic insecurity.
27  That 
smoking would cause weight loss is consistent with this hypothesis.   
                                                            
26 Recall the instruments here are the set of unemployment rates in the areas the individual 
is reported to have lived between 1988 and 2000.   
27 Evidence for this tobacco-insecurity hypothesis is outlined in Pomerleau (1997) and 
Smith (2006).    
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Note also that higher levels of education, though (being a personal choice) 
potentially endogenous, appear to be associated with lower levels of weight gain.  
It is possible, of course, that education promotes weight loss for other reasons (e.g., 
better knowledge of nutrition science), but these results could also be interpreted as 
supportive of the hypothesis that education influences body weight by improving 
economic security (e.g., by enabling individuals to adapt to job changes and other 
shocks to economic security).   
Public and Private Safety Nets 
Given that catastrophic income loss causes weight gain, one might expect that 
measures that “cushion the blow” would  ameliorate insecurity-induced weight 
gains.  Table 4 considers three examples of “safety nets” that could serve this 
purpose.   
In the first two columns, we examine the effect of the size of payments 
received (via inheritance)
28 due to the death of a friend or family member in 2000, 
and find small  (just over 3 pounds per $100,000 received)  but statistically 
significant negative effects on weight gain.   
Health insurance is another means by which individuals can be protected from 
large negative income shocks.  Because health insurance is often purchased on the 
individual market or is contingent upon employment, it is subject to the well-
known adverse selection problem: because healthier individuals are less likely to 
need health insurance, they are less likely (at a given price) to purchase it.  On the 
other hand, health insurance can also induce a moral hazard problem: given the 
presence of insurance, individuals might invest less time or money in health-
promoting preventive measures (such as active weight loss) that might decrease the 
demand for medical services in the future (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).  Our IV 
estimation strategy should eliminate the adverse selection problem.  Our estimate 
of the effect of health insurance on weight (using various state-level measures of 
regulation of insurance markets that affect the price of health insurance as 
instruments) can thus be interpreted as the  net effect of two opposing forces: 
weight loss due to improved financial security, offset by weight gain induced by 
moral hazard.  As the  fourth column in Table 4 indicates, the security effect 
dominates, by more than 15 pounds.  Adverse selection (healthy individuals opting 
out of the insurance market) also seems to be important and affects our estimates in 
the expected direction, as evidenced by the 17-pound difference between our OLS 
and IV estimates.   
A similar effect is seen for total government transfer payments received, and 
again the marginal impact on weight gain is large.  The OLS estimate of the effect 
of government transfer payments is positive, indicating that transfer recipients had 
a slightly larger weight gain, even controlling for income.  Of course, individuals 
who receive transfer payments are likely to have many omitted  personal 
                                                            
28 Inheritance is treated as an exogenous variable in all specifications.  
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characteristics that may also affect their weight, and this OLS estimate cannot 
indicate the causal effect of a more generous social insurance program.  However, 
the IV estimate of the effect of government transfer payments (using state 
maximum benefits for a family of three as the instrument) indicates that an 
additional $100 of government benefits in 2000 is associated with a 1.2 pound 
reduction in weight gain.  This is a large effect, possibly due to the fact that all 
government support is not measured.  For instance, if more generous states also 
have more extensive support for child care, health care, or housing, this variable 
may capture the cumulative effect of all of these government support programs.   
Implications for Consumer Welfare 
The implications of weight gain for consumer welfare are not uncontroversial.  
If consumers freely choose how much to eat and how much to exercise, then 
(assuming complete markets) conventional welfare analysis would conclude that 
government intervention aimed at improving health through weight loss could not 
make people better off.  Such analysis would suggest, moreover, that if the rise in 
obesity observed in recent decades has been driven by a concurrent rise in the 
opportunity cost  of time, then  obesity can  actually be viewed as an  optimal 
outcome, by the metric of economic efficiency (Chou, et al. 2004, Cutler et al. 
2003).  In other words, the fact that we are collectively fatter might be taken as a 
sign that we are collectively better off.
29   
Of course, if self-control problems are an important determinant of weight 
gain, it is no longer clear that efficiencies in the markets for food or labor translate 
into welfare gains.
30  But our findings suggest an entirely different perspective: if 
apparently time-inconsistent choices about diet and exercise are in fact natural 
responses to risk, then body weights will be excessive only to the extent that risk is 
excessive.  And while a revamping of America’s social safety net may be a novel 
solution to the modern obesity epidemic, many threats to economic security (job 
stability, availability of health care, etc.) are arguably a function of factors beyond 
the control of the individual consumer.  It might be appropriate, then, to recast this 
                                                            
29 One commonly cited “market failure” associated with obesity is the above-mentioned 
moral hazard problem (e.g., Bhattacharya and Sood 2005).  To the extent that health 
insurance is inducing weight gain, public expenditures to promote weight loss might be 
justified on efficiency grounds.  Our results suggest, however, that the net effect of health 
insurance on weight is negative.   
30 Cutler et al. (2003), for instance, argue that if self-control problems are strong enough, 
they could more than offset efficiency gains made elsewhere.  They also note, however, 
that—measured in the currency of time cost—the 20-minute decrease in the amount of time 
required for daily food preparation realized in the last few decades more than offsets the 15 
minutes of exercise that would be required to offset the gains in weight observed over the 
same time period.    
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debate over the putative impact of obesity on consumer welfare as a discussion of 
the welfare effects of economic insecurity.  Indeed, if the proportion of the modern 
obesity epidemic attributable to economic insecurity could be reliably estimated,
31 
the cost of the associated weight gain could provide a lower bound on the social 
cost of risk in the marketplace.
32   
It is perhaps also worth noting that economic insecurity—regardless of its 
impact on consumer welfare—is difficult to measure.  It requires data that can 
speak to future expectations, perhaps (as our constructs assume) as revealed by life 
experience.  In this respect, our findings might offer some hope: In principle, one 
could use weight gain (after controlling for other possible causes) as a barometer 
of economic insecurity. 
Conclusion 
There can be no real individual freedom in the presence of economic insecurity. 
    --Chester Bowles, US diplomat & economist (1901-1986) 
In the natural world, body fat serves as an insurance plan, and animals at 
greater risk of starvation are more likely to gain weight.  This phenomenon has 
received little attention in the study of human obesity, and (perhaps as a result) 
epidemiological studies have often conflated the effects of income, time costs, and 
economic insecurity, and have not always accounted for potential reverse causation 
or unobserved individual characteristics.   
Our results provide strong evidence that economic insecurity does in fact 
cause weight gain.  Each of three measures of economic insecurity (probability of 
unemployment, volatility of income, and number of income drops) generate weight 
gains, with magnitudes that are considerable relative to the overall increase in 
weight observed over a 12 year period.  While the mean respondent gained 21 
pounds over our 12-year window, for instance, a decrease of one standard 
deviation in  our various measures of economic insecurity corresponds to a 
decrease in weight gain ranging from 5 to 13 pounds.  We also find that private 
windfalls (as measured by  a  reported inheritance), health insurance, and social 
                                                            
31 While our analysis provides estimates of the magnitude of the impact of selected 
measures of insecurity on weight gain, the limited size of our sample precludes us from 
simultaneously estimating, for example, the relative impacts of food price and availability.  
Moreover, our data is longitudinal and thus cannot speak to demographic changes in the 
population.   
32 Such costs would arguably include not just the cost of lost productivity and medical 
treatment for obesity-related illness (which in 2001 reportedly added up to $117 billion in 
the U.S. [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001]), but also associated 
consumer expenditures on food.    
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insurance (government transfers) lead to decreases in weight gains, and again the 
effect is large: an increase of one standard deviation in support provided by 
financial safety nets leads to decreased weight gains of between 1 and 14 pounds.   
As noted at the outset, this study does not attempt to address the proximate 
mechanisms (presumably some combination of the quality or quantity of food 
consumed, physical activity, and metabolic rate) by which economic insecurity 
leads to weight gain.  These proximate mechanisms have been the primary focus of 
the epidemiological research on obesity, and a major implication of our findings is 
that  without a better understanding of the ultimate  causes of each mechanism 
(presumably some combination of information sets and material constraints), the 
potential for misinterpretation in obesity research is great.  In particular, studies 
that measure associations between body weight and the proximate mechanisms 
(e.g., depression, poor dietary quality, physical e xercise) by which economic 
insecurity might drive weight gain could suffer—if they fail to properly control for 
insecurity—from omitted variables bias.  Needless to say, such errors of omission 
could also limit the utility of such studies for informing the public policy response 
to the modern obesity epidemic.   
There is also the question of the cause of the recent increase in the incidence 
of obesity in the U.S. and around the world.  Unfortunately, the measures of 
economic insecurity available to us in this study are not easily recovered from 
historical data, making it difficult for us to estimate how much of the observed 
secular  trend might be attributable to changes in economic insecurity.  
Nevertheless,  for at least one of our  variables  we can perform a  “back of the 
envelope” calculation to obtain a measure of the potential contribution of changes 
in insecurity to the overall trend.  Between 1979 and 2001, the prevalence of health 
insurance among U.S. workers decreased by about eight percentage points (Gilmer 
and Kronick 2005).  During roughly the same period, the average body weight of 
men aged 30-39 (i.e., working age men young enough to be unaffected by changes 
in retirement security) increased by 13.6 pounds (Ogden et al. 2004).  Using our 
estimate of the effect of health insurance on body weight, the observed decrease in 
health coverage translates into a population average weight gain of 1.2 pounds.  In 
other words, changes in health insurance markets alone could potentially account 
for nearly 9% of the observed trend in body weight.  It is also worth noting that 
some commentators have argued that—over the same thirty years or so in which 
obesity has risen so dramatically—there has been a concurrent increase in the 
degree to which individual households in the U.S. are exposed to other types of 
financial risk.
33   
                                                            
33 See, for example, Neumark (2000) on the rate of involuntary job loss and Hacker (2004, 
2006) for discussions of the change from defined-benefit pensions to individual 401(k) 
accounts.  Auld and Powell (2006) also note that Canada—a country with an arguably 
stronger social safety net—has an obesity rate that is 7 percentage points lower than the US 
rate, with at most 1/3 of the difference attributable to demographic differences.   
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The relationship between economic insecurity and weight gain bears all the 
hallmarks of an evolutionary adaptation: it has strong parallels in studies of animal 
behavior; it is evidently governed by behavioral algorithms written into our DNA; 
and it is associated with behaviors commonly perceived as “emotional” rather than 
“rational,” as these terms are understood in common usage.  Moreover, a 
“fattening response” to the presence of economic insecurity would appear to be 
more appropriate in a pre-industrial world—in which the food supply was far less 
stable—than it is today.  But the question of whether such behavior remains 
“optimal”  in the modern world  is beside the point.  The fact that economic 
insecurity appears to be an important cause of weight gain in the U.S. today 
suggests the need for additional research that will improve our understanding of 
both the various ways in which the income of American families is at risk, and the 
particular ways in which such risk is translated into weight gain.    
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Tables and Figures 




Mean  Standard Deviation 
Family income (in $1000) in 2000  57.417  53.242 
Family income (in $1000) squared in 2000  6130  16055 
Hourly Wage in 2000  20.993  60.412 
Unemployed at time of survey in 2000  0.026  0.160 
Unemployed any time in 2000  0.118  0.323 
Posterior probability of unemployment, 2000  0.026  0.077 
Annual income: Rate of Change (slope), 1988-2000              2.925  2.726 
Annual income: Goodness of Fit (
2 R ), 1988-2000             0.575  0.320 
Number of Drops in Real Family Income, 1988-2000  2.13  1.247 
Total value of inheritance (in $1000)  2.209  21.671 
Government transfer payments received in 2000 (in $1000)  0.194  1.173 
Covered by Health Insurance, 2000  0.836  0.37 
Currently smoke, 2000  0.31  0.462 
Weight (in lbs) in 1988  176.552  31.884 
Weight (in lbs) in 1988  176.552  31.884 
Weight (in lbs) in 2000  197.508  39.035 
Change in Weight, 1988-2000  20.991  23.0165 
Height (in inches)  69.66  2.587 
Height (in inches) squared  4859.283  358.7407 
Age in 2000  38.865  2.267 
Black  0.275  0.446 
Hispanic  0.184  0.387 
White  0.542  0.498 
Married in 2000  0.608  0.488 
Never Married by 2000  0.205  0.404 
Divorce or separated by 2000  0.183  0.387 
Widowed by 2000  0.003  0.06 
BA  0.220  0.415 
Some college  0.216  0.411 
High school graduate  0.445  0.497 
High school dropout  0.119  0.323 
Live within a metropolitan area in 2000  0.066  0.249 
     
Sources:  See Data Appendix.    
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Table 1b:  Means and Standard Deviations of State Characteristics 
NLSY79, various years  
Characteristic  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1988  6.325  2.597 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1989  5.535  2.077 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1990  5.673  1.965 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1991  73.836  27.415 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1992  8.014  2.5 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1993  7.548  2.614 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1994  7.129  2.687 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1996  6.847  3.104 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 1998  5.103  2.81 
Unemployment rate in local labor market, 2000  4.477  2.538 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1988  34.63  8.247 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1989  39.199  9.848 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1990  41.737  11.779 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1991  46.59  11.756 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1992  47.397  12.172 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1993  54.021  14.426 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1994  56.65  17.461 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1996  58.067  19.35 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 1998  60.561  21.979 
State cigarette tax (in cents), 2000  79.027  30.678 
Median household income, 2000  42571.05  5289.083 
Maximum welfare benefits for family of 3, 2000  395.883  152.435 
State minimum wage, 2000  5.284  0.31 
Mean State Annual income: Goodness of Fit (
2 R ), 1988-2000  0.548  0.041 
Median State Annual income: Goodness of Fit (
2 R ), 1988-2000  0.609  0.075 
Mean State Annual income: Rate of Change (slope), 1988-2000  2.761  0.372 
Median State Annual income: Rate of Change (slope), 1988-2000  2.35  0.395 
Mean State Number of Drops in Real Family Income, 1988-2000  2.067  0.143 
State Health Insurance Regulation: Plan Liability, 2000  0.257  0.437 
State Small Group Health Insurance Regulation: No. of Mandates, 2000  31.126  9.247 
State Small Group Health Insurance Regulation: NAIC Rating Bands, 
2000  0.599  0.49 
State Small Group Health Insurance Regulation: Tight Rating Bands, 
2000  0.234  0.423 
State Small Group Health Insurance Regulation: Community Rating, 
2000  0.364  0.481 
State Individual Health Insurance Regulation: Any Market Reform, 2000  0.24  0.427 
State Individual Health Insurance Regulation: Guaranteed Issue, 2000  0.17  0.384 
     
Sources:  See Data Appendix  
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Table 2:  Effect of Income, Wage and Current Unemployment on Body Weight in Men, 2000 
Variables  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Family income (in $1000), 2000  -0.008  0.22***  -0.008  0.032  -0.006  0.115*** 
  (0.007)  (0.065)  (0.007)  (0.092)  (0.008)  (0.03) 
Hourly Wage, 2000          --                    --  0.003      0.336***              --  -- 
      (0.002)  (0.112)     
Unemployed at time of survey in 2000          --                     --  --  --  0.301  -6.621 
          (3.094)  (6.468) 
Unemployed anytime in 2000  --  --  --  --  1.551  17.181** 
          (1.635)  (7.533) 
Currently Smoke, 2000  -4.367***  -13.676  -4.321***  -24.243***  -4.469***  -9.709* 
  (1.057)  (10.552)  (1.206)  (8.621)  (1.062)  (5.559) 
Weight in 1988 (in pounds)  0.968***  0.949***  0.968***  0.948***  0.968***  0.965*** 
  (0.02)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.02)  (0.015) 
Height (in inches)  4.532  0.981  -0.47  -2.268  4.604  4.995 
  (5.382)  (4.958)  (5.343)  (5.752)  (5.352)  (4.012) 
Height (in inches) squared  -0.026  0  0.01  0.025  -0.026  -0.03 
  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.03) 
Age  -0.727***  -0.849***  -0.868***  -0.786**  -0.729***  -0.906*** 
  (0.158)  (0.15)  (0.171)  (0.315)  (0.157)  (0.103) 
Black  8.255***  9.848***  8.421***  9.642***  8.153***  8.019*** 
  (1.142)  (1.179)  (1.188)  (1.093)  (1.172)  (0.85) 
Hispanic  3.422***  3.107***  2.42**  3.55**  3.357***  2.026*** 
  (1.177)  (1.202)  (1.164)  (1.43)  (1.190)  (0.782) 
Married  1.439  -8.195**  1.576  -4.465  1.527  -2.651* 
  (1.295)  (3.337)  (1.323)  (3.006)  (1.284)  (1.534) 
Divorced or Separated  -1.82  -3.884***  -1.372  -2.535**  -1.768  -2.74** 
  (1.476)  (1.365)  (1.546)  (1.257)  (1.443)  (1.072) 
Widow  -3.859  5.919  -5.743  1.73  -3.846  3.859 
  (13.715)  (9.995)  (17.873)  (15.304)  (13.854)  (9.561) 
BA Degree  -2.442  -18.019**  -1.763  -20.995***  -2.348  -8.619** 
  (1.816)  (8.041)  (1.726)  (6.98)  (1.809)  (3.637) 
Some College  -1.042  -7.985*  0.135  -10.008***  -0.965  -2.678 
  (1.756)  (4.333)  (1.687)  (3.852)  (1.744)  (2.316) 
High School Graduate  0.521  -3.032  1.198  -4.858**  0.615  -0.183 
  (1.671)  (2.561)  (1.791)  (2.384)  (1.647)  (1.462) 
Live Within a Metropolitan Area  -0.523  2.539  -1.72  -0.644  -0.544  1.883 
  (1.935)  (1.811)  (1.960)  (1.734)  (1.907)  (1.278) 
N   2813  2605  2575  2403  2813  2552 
2 R   0.67  0.591  0.68  0.324  0.67  0.641 
             
Sources:  See Data Appendix 
Variables are for the year 2000, unless otherwise specified 
Robust standard errors (adjusted for within-state clustering) in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3:  Effect of Economic Insecurity on Body Weight in Men, 2000 
Variables   OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Family income (in $1000)  -0.005  0.131**  -0.012  -0.069  -0.008  0.097** 
  (0.008)  (0.032)  (0.009)  (0.07)  (0.008)  (0.042) 
Posterior probability of   13.244  112.918**                  --  --  --  -- 
  unemployment  (8.277)  (22.76)         
Annual income: Rate of Change              --  --  0.211  3.003  --  -- 
  (slope), 1988-2000                  (0.266)  (1.938)     
Annual income: Goodness of Fit              --  --  -0.477     -29.4***                --  -- 
  (
2 R ),  1988-2000      (1.671)  (9.125)     
Number of Drops in Real Family             --  --  --  --  -0.128  5.464*** 
  Income, 1988-2000          (0.337)  (1.726) 
Currently Smoke  -4.559***  -3.614  -4.298***  -2.453  -4.351***  0.682 
  (1.057)  (4.334)  (1.05)  (3.839)  (1.046)  (7.458) 
Weight in 1988 (in pounds)  0.968***  0.969**  0.968***  0.996***  0.968***  0.989*** 
  (0.02)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Height (in inches)  4.655  4.517  3.534  2.715  4.483  7* 
  (5.421)  (3.089)  (5.384)  (4.185)  (5.42)  (3.806) 
Height (in inches)  squared  -0.027  -0.027  -0.019  -0.014  -0.025  -0.046 
  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.028) 
Age  -0.729***  -0.909**  -0.687***  -0.703***  -0.727***  -0.817*** 
  (0.157)  (0.138)  (0.166)  (0.116)  (0.158)  (0.109) 
Black  7.922***  5.66**  8.258***  7.264***  8.233***  9.621*** 
  (1.207)  (0.728)  (1.134)  (0.514)  (1.125)  (0.731) 
Hispanic  3.313***  1.656*  3.415***  3.304***  3.413***  3.588*** 
  (1.161)  (0.787)  (1.181)  (0.792)  (1.175)  (0.911) 
Married  1.672  -1.718  1.133  2.044  1.452  -2.02 
  (1.263)  (1.761)  (1.348)  (3.057)  (1.289)  (2.413) 
Divorced or Separated  -1.674  -2.319  -1.928  -4.454***  -1.775  -5.329*** 
  (1.443)  (1.349)  (1.487)  (1.028)  (1.48)  (1.178) 
Widow  -3.486  6.313  -4.057  -4.404  -3.859  -1.056 
  (13.708)  (7.778)  (13.830)  (7.615)  (13.733)  (9.33) 
BA Degree  -2.214  -5.539  -2.892  0.052  -2.473  -1.484 
  (1.794)  (3.314)  (1.806)  (4.963)  (1.814)  (5.998) 
Some College  -0.86  -0.731  -1.23  2.716  -1.044  0.278 
  (1.722)  (1.94)  (1.735)  (3.089)  (1.761)  (3.238) 
High School Graduate  0.69  0.757  0.38  2.509  0.513  1.366 
  (1.638)  (1.313)  (1.643)  (2.032)  (1.671)  (2.082) 
Live Within a Metropolitan Area  -0.6  1.833  -0.552  0.672  -0.505  0.989 
  (1.955)  (1.38)  (1.97)  (1.318)  (1.933)  (1.488) 
N   2813  2552  2772  2513  2813  2552 
2 R   0.68  0.618  0.67  0.641  0.67  0.637 
Sources:  See Data Appendix 
Variables are for the year 2000, unless otherwise specified 
Robust standard errors (adjusted for within-state clustering) in parentheses.   
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
24 
Table 4:  Effect of Financial Safety Nets on Body Weight in Men, 2000 
Variables   OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Family income  -0.006  0.129***  -0.006  0.092***  -0.004  0.118*** 
  (in $1000)  (0.008)  (0.032)  (0.007)  (0.02)  (0.008)  (0.037) 
Inheritance Received   -0.036***  -0.034***  --  --  --  -- 
  (in $1000)  (0.01)  (0.008)         
Health Insurance  --  --  1.82  -15.031***  --  -- 
      (1.161)  (4.166)     
Government Transfer   --  --  --  --  0.499  -11.54*** 
  Payments (in $1000)          (0.319)  (3.016) 
Posterior Probability   13.254  111.064***  15.302*  60.951***  12.929  167.356*** 
  of Unemployment  (8.275)  (22.725)  (8.727)  (20.9)  (8.483)  (39.828) 
Currently Smoke  -4.603***  -2.87  -4.472***  1.166  -4.397***  2.336 
  (1.055)  (4.285)  (1.06)  (3.048)  (1.11)  (6.495) 
Weight in 1988 (in pounds)  0.968***  0.972***  0.967***  0.978***  0.968***  1.002*** 
  (0.02)  (0.015)  (0.02)  (0.011)  (0.02)  (0.017) 
Height (in inches)  4.847  4.934  4.598  6.36**  4.471  5.28 
  (5.404)  (3.062)  (5.388)  (3.104)  (5.395)  (3.518) 
Height (in inches) squared  -0.028  -0.03  -0.026  -0.039*  -0.025  -0.033 
  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.039)  (0.026) 
Age  -0.73***  -0.898***  -0.738***  -0.891***  -0.766***  -0.858*** 
  (0.158)  (0.139)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (0.157)  (0.137) 
Black  7.851***  5.632***  7.956***  6.142***  7.669***  5.686*** 
  (1.196)  (0.706)  (1.195)  (0.677)  (1.226)  (1.423) 
Hispanic  3.246***  1.694**  3.403***  2.454***  3.559***  1.9* 
  (1.158)  (0.79)  (1.169)  (0.752)  (1.183)  (1.036) 
Married  1.704  -1.452  1.348  1.957*  1.762  -1.769 
  (1.267)  (1.774)  (1.308)  (1.045)  (1.184)  (2.294) 
Divorced or Separated   -1.623  -2.266*  -1.787  -2.011***  -1.666  -2.459 
  (1.447)  (1.328)  (1.459)  (0.762)  (1.371)  (1.677) 
Widow  -3.5  6.425  -3.279  1.457  -3.793  -3.281 
  (13.679)  (7.918)  (13.571)  (6.83)  (13.47)  (15.219) 
BA Degree  -2.095  -5.009  -2.607  1.591  -2.716  -4.719 
  (1.779)  (3.269)  (1.869)  (2.332)  (1.796)  (4.733) 
Some College  -0.859  -0.383  -1.222  4.76***  -1.377  -1.959 
  (1.707)  (1.938)  (1.763)  (1.672)  (1.746)  (2.771) 
High School Graduate  0.64  0.837  0.452  4.164***  0.008  -0.471 
  (1.627)  (1.275)  (1.702)  (1.433)  (1.699)  (1.966) 
Live Within a   -0.516  1.769  -0.479  -0.053  -0.469  -0.197 
  Metropolitan Area  (1.923)  (1.344)  (1.942)  (1.815)  (1.965)  (1.824) 
N   2801  2552  2813  2552  2811  2539 
2 R   0.68  0.62  0.68  0.625  0.68  0.4486 
Sources:  See Data Appendix 
Variables are for the year 2000, unless otherwise specified 
Robust standard errors (adjusted for within-state clustering) in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
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Data Appendix 
Description of Constructed and non-NLSY Variables 
Posterior Probability of Unemployment.  NLSY79 includes weekly data on 
employment status (working, unemployed, out of labor force, etc.) for each 
subject.  What we would like to do is derive from this information an 
approximation of each respondent’s subjective beliefs about the probability of 
experiencing involuntary job loss at the time of the 2000 survey (when final body 
weight is measured in our sample).  In calculating this probability, we posit that it 
is fixed but unknown (to the worker) at the beginning of the worker’s current 
career, and that each worker adjusts his beliefs in a Bayesian manner as time goes 
on.  We calculate the posterior probability as follows: 
Consider the  fixed (but unknown)  probability  p of  a worker  becoming 
unemployed over a period of  1 n +  weeks.  He knows at the outset that there are 
k   possible  values of  p, denoted  i p  for  1,2,..., ik =  and prior probabilities 
( ) i P pp = .  After n  weeks I observe that I have been unemployed for a total of 
xn £  weeks.  The probability that I will be unemployed in week  1 n +  is then 
given by  








= ￿   (6) 
where  
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and (since for any given value  i p , x  is the realization of a binomially distributed 
random variable)  
  ( )









  (8) 
To implement  (6),  we generated values for  i p  (job-loss hazard) and 
( ) i P pp =  (prior probability of a given hazard level) from the sample of 5507 
male NLSY79 respondents for whom comprehensive weekly employment data is 
available during our sample window.  In particular, observations on the total 
number of weeks of unemployment experienced were sorted into 100 bins (i.e., of 
approximately 55 observations each);  i p  was then calculated as the mean hazard 
(number of weeks unemployed divided by total number of weeks) for individuals 
in the  ith bin, with prior probability  ( ) i P pp =  given by the number of 
observations in bin i divided by the total number of observations.   
 
Annual Income:  Rate of Change and Goodness of fit, 1988-2000.  Annual 
family income is reported in NLSY79 for each survey year.  These variables take  
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these year/income pairs and apply simple least-squares regression calculations, 
with a separate regression for each individual for whom at least three annual 
income levels are reported.  The “Rate of Change” is the slope coefficient 
(interpreted as the annual change in income per year), and “Goodness of Fit” is the 
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  (10) 
where n  is the number of years for which income observations are available, and 
y  and t  are income and the year in which observation i  is reported, respectively.  
Of course,  2 R  will take a maximum value of 1, with larger values indicating fewer 
(or smaller) deviations from a linear trend in income.   
 
Health Insurance Policies.  Seven state-level measures of health insurance-
related regulation were obtained from the December 1999 State Legislative Health 
Care and Insurance Issues published by BlueCross BlueShield Association.  Plan 
Liability indicates whether a state has laws in place that hold health plans and their 
employees liable for damages for harm to enrollees; No. of Mandates is a count of 
the number of specific plan mandates (benefits, providers, or persons covered) 
written into state law; NAIC Rating Bands, Tight Rating Bands, and Community 
Rating are various measures of the extent to which plans can use experience, health 
status, and/or duration of coverage in setting small group rates; Any Market Reform 
is a composite of these three variables, applied to the market for individual plans; 
and  Guaranteed Issue  states require health plans to offer coverage to all 
individuals regardless of their health status or claims experience.   
 
Hourly Wage.  This variable  was  constructed by dividing annual wage 
income by total hours respondent reported working in 2000.  Both are NLSY79 
variables. 
 
Median Household Income.  This variable represents the median household 
income in respondent’s state of residence in 2000; this data comes from the U.S. 
Statistical Abstract. 
 
Minimum Wage.  Nominal minimum wages for all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia for 2000 are used.  Data are in dollars.  Data were obtained from  
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Neumark and Nizalova, NBER  Working Paper  #10656 2004, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10656.  
 
Number of Drops in Real Family Income, 1988-2000.  Family  annual 
income in each survey year is reported in NLSY79.  This variable is a count of the 
number of times family income (adjusted for inflation) was lower than the most 
recently reported previous income.   
 
Self Reported Weight and Height Corrections.  Self-reported weight and 
height were corrected for reporting bias using the method described in Cawley 
(2000).  Matched data on reported and actual heights and weights from the 
NHANES III survey were used for this purpose.  Separate OLS regressions were 
performed for each sex and race/ethnic group. 
To estimate the actual weight in pounds of an individual, actual weight of the 
subset of NHANES III respondents between the ages of 26 and 45 was regressed 
on reported weight (in lbs.), reported weight squared, and the respondent’s age in 
years.  Estimated coefficients were then used to correct for the bias.  Coefficients 
for reporting error in height were computed by regressing actual height on reported 
height (in inches) and reported height in inches squared.   
 
Smoking/Cigarette Variables.  We constructed a variable that represents 
whether an individual smokes at the time of the interview.  This is used in the year 
2000.  The NLSY79 question is do you smoke now?  With responses: daily, 
occasionally, and not at all.  We formed daily and occasionally into one group and 
not at all into a separate group in order to form a single dummy variable. 
Data on cigarette price and cigarette taxes for each state in the years covered 
are from The Tax Burden on Tobacco, by Orzechowski and Walker. 
 
Welfare Benefits.  Welfare benefits data for 2000 is obtained from the Green 
Book, published by the Congressional Committee on Ways and Means 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/index.html).  The data provided is the 
maximum payment in dollars a family of three would receive in each state.    
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